We study the relationship between credit, stock trading and prices bubbles. The role of credit in financial bubbles is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, it may help rational arbitrageurs to trade against a bubble; on the other hand, it may enable naive speculators to buy overvalued assets. We construct a novel database containing every individual stock transaction in three major British companies during the 1720 South Sea Bubble. We link these transactions to daily margin loan positions and subscription lists of new share issues. We find that margin loan holders acted as extrapolators, i.e., they were more likely to buy (sell) following high (low) past returns. Loan holders also signed up to buy new shares of overvalued companies and incurred large trading losses. Our results suggest that credit provision was instrumental in fueling the bubble.
Introduction
The credit boom preceding the 2008 financial meltdown has sparked economists' interest in the relation between debt, trading decisions and asset prices. Recent empirical work has shown that easy access to credit is at the root of the 2000s housing price boom (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Favara and Imbs, 2015; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2017) . While the relationship between debt and prices of real assets has been widely studied, much less is known about the interaction between debt and prices of financial assets. Such a relationship is theoretically more ambiguous because it is easier to short a financial asset than a real one. On the one hand, a rational arbitrageur could use credit to bring prices back to fundamental values. On the other hand, a speculator could borrow money to fuel a bubble. Which of the two effects dominates is an important empirical question that we address in this paper.
An ideal test compares the equity trades of a loanholder with those of an unindebted investor and accurately measures trader-specific performance because bubble theories predict that speculators lose money vis-à-vis arbitrageurs. Such an analysis is difficult for three reasons.
First, we typically do not observe trader identities and are therefore unable to link transactions to loan positions and measure performance at the investor level. Second, there might be a spurious correlation between borrowing and trading, because investors may decide buy a stock and borrow money following a particular news event. Third, we would like to capture a large proportion of the equity market in order to make general statements about the relationship between debt and asset prices. While this would be easier with aggregate, market level data, it is more complicated with disaggregated, individual level data.
In our paper, we tackle these issues by studying margin loan provisions in the London equity market during the 1720 South Sea episode, a financial boom and crash that is widely considered as a textbook example of a bubble. In the early run up of the bubble, the Bank of England opens a facility allowing its shareholders to borrow money by posting Bank shares as collateral. For three of the largest British companies, we hand-collect every single equity transaction and margin loan with unique buyer, seller and borrower identities. The three companies represent over 50% of the market in terms of pre-bubble capitalization and our data set covers bubble-year 1720 and the five years leading up to it. We link the trading and loan data to the complete list of subscribers of three shares offerings initiated by highly overvalued companies.
The scope and level of detail of our data allow us to address each of the three empirical challenges outlined above. First, our data precisely links an investor's loan position to her trading strategies and performance. As a result, we can test whether trading behavior of investors with margin loans is significantly different from that of other traders, and whether loan holders gain or lose while the bubble unfolds. Second, the individual level data also allow us to control for news and changes in the macroeconomic environment so that we can precisely identify the role of debt in determining trading behavior. Third, as we have all trading information for more than 50% of the market, we can make market wide statements about the relationship between debt and asset prices.
Our evidence suggests that investors with margin loans behave as extrapolators, that is, they are more likely to buy following days of high share returns and more likely to sell following days of low share returns. For instance, in the spring of 1720, when equity prices rise by more than 50%, loan holders are approximately 65% more likely to buy shares vis-à-vis other traders. In addition, margin loan holders are twice as likely to subscribe to new share offerings of the South Sea Company and London Assurance trading at peak prices (six-eight times pre-bubble quotes).
Even without taking these share subscriptions into account, loan holders incur large trading losses.
More specifically, their realized annual return is 17 percentage points below the average investor.
Overall, we find that 79% of loan holder capital behaves in a way that is strongly at odds with what we would expect from a rational arbitrageur. In particular, they hold long positions in bubbling stocks when prices reach their peak or subscribe to overvalued equity in the summer of 1720. While stock option data no longer exists, it is very difficult to reconcile such behavior with the intention to short the bubble. Last, but not least, we also find that the trading activities of loan holders move prices. In days when loan holders are particularly active buying stocks, the end of the day returns are higher than on an average day.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on leverage, margin loans and the behavior of asset prices. A large number of papers has been studying whether the provision of margin loan has had a destabilizing impact on financial markets by increasing stock price volatility (Salinger, 1989; Schwert, 1989; Hardouvelis, 1990; Hardouvelis and Peristiani, 1992; Hardouvelis and Theodossiou, 2002) . Most of this literature is based on time series evidence where it is hard to disentangle reverse causality and it is difficult to understand whether the findings are driven by the supply of margin loans or other factors such as monetary policy or economic growth forecasts. The use of micro-level data on trading and the detailed information on loan holders allows to overcome the causality issues inherent to these studies.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of trading strategies during financial bubbles. In particular, we highlight that margin loan holders behave as naive or speculative traders as predicted by various bubble theories. We also show that indeed debt can contribute to fuel a bubble as predicted by a number of theoretical models (Scheinkman, 2014; Geanakoplos, 2003 Geanakoplos, , 2010 . Furthermore, we show that the trading strategy of margin loan holders during the bubble leads to poor performance. This finding adds to the literature on trading strategies during bubble periods and subsequent investor performance (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; Temin and Voth, 2004; Dass, Massa, and Patgiri, 2008; Greenwood and Nagel, 2009; Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu, 2011; Xiong and Yu, 2011) .
Third, we contribute to the historical literature on the South Sea bubble. We provide new data and give a new micro-econometric view of the behavior of traders in the London stock market in 1720. Since the South Sea episode is generally considered as a classical example of an asset price bubble, it has been widely studied by economists and historians including Garber (1990); Neal (1993) ; Carlos, Moyen, and Hill (2002) ; Dale (2004) ; Temin and Voth (2004) ; Dale, Johnson, and Tang (2005) ; Carlos and Neal (2006) ; Shea (2007) and Frehen, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2013) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the market in securities in 1720 London and describes the historical setting of the margin loan facility. In sections 3 and 4 we describe the data and discuss the empirical results respectively. We conclude in section 5.
2 Historical setting
Bank of England margin loan facility
On 10 May 1720 the board of the Bank of England opens a margin loan facility. The motivation behind this decision becomes not completely clear from minutes of the court of director minutes as they simply argue that it may be for the service of this bank to lend money to the proprietors upon this bank stock.
1 Dickson (1967) argues that this margin loan facility is a direct response to the margin loan facility that the general court of its main competitor, the South Sea Company, approved on April 25th. Over the course of a few weeks the loan terms and procedure to obtain a margin loan are determined. The shareholders were granted the right to borrow cash money (Neal, 1993) . On September 29th the Bank starts to recall the margin loans by offering a favorable repayment scheme for lenders that repaid quickly. On October 6th the Bank writes letters to big companies like the Royal Exchange Assurance, London Assurance Company and the East India Company and to other persons to hasten the payment of loans they had with the Bank. In similar vein the directors decide on the same day that there are no loans be made upon bank stock until further order. Hence, the obligation to bailout the South Sea Company resulted in a sudden retraction of credit and ended the margin loan facility.
Although the enforcement of these legally binding loan contracts is unclear, some economic historians have argued that borrowers could default on their loan by simply walking away from their obligation (Dale, Johnson, and Tang, 2005) . Since the market value of the collateralized shares continuously exceeded the loan amount, investors had a strong incentive to repay the loan.
In the fall of 1720 it became clear that the Bank of England preferred to give debtors further time,
in the belief that they would pay in the end (Dickson, 1967) . As a result, only few loan holders default or enter bankruptcy procedures. The margin loans provided by the Bank of England and the South Sea Company created a substantial influx of capital at that time (Scott, 1910) . Between
May 10th and October 6th, 1720 the Bank lends a total of £1,476,350 in 958 loans to 659 different shareholders. The ledger books thus link individual trader's daily loan positions to share trades creating a unique opportunity to study the effect of credit provision on bubble trading behavior for a large cross-section of traders.
Short sale markets
In 1720, there was a well-established market for derivatives on British securities that offered various option like contracts like futures, forwards, puts, and naked-short sells (Dickson, 1967; Cope, 1978) .
Since these contracts were privately negotiated, it is difficult to gauge how widespread this option market was in 1720. Economic historians have argued that there were extensive opportunities to sell short in 1720 (Neal, 1993; Voth, 2008) . These arguments are supported by several indicators suggesting that there was a liquid market for options at the time. First, several brokers specialized in dealing with option like contracts (Scott, 1910) . Second, many of the preserved option contracts make use of standardized pre-printed forms, which indicates a developed market (Shea, 2004) .
Third, archival records of private ledgers reveal several sizeable short sale contracts. For instance, Hamilton (1967) gives details on a major short sale of £100,000 of East India Stock by John Law in 1719-1720. Another example is Richard Cantillion since he made a fortune by actively trading put options in the South Sea Company during the bubble (Murphy, 1986) . Furthermore Kleer (2015) documents sizeable trading in South Sea short sale contracts of Company directors in 1720 using data from brokers' accounts. Finally, the accounts of contemporary broker David La Cour reveal that options were sold against a reasonable price, also during the summer of 1720.
2 Conclusively, these pieces of evidence strengthen us in our believe that there was a reasonably liquid market of derivatives that allowed for short selling opportunities.
Data
We retrieve data from a broad set of sources. Our first data source are Bank of England (henceforth: BOE) and the East Inda Company (henceforth: EIC) stock ledgers which consist of traderspecific accounts recording buys, sells and BOE share loans for every trader (see Figure 1 ). Each account is linked to an index containing trader names and characteristics (titles, street address and occupation, see Figure 2 ). In addition to trader-specific accounts, transactions are also signed by both buyer and seller in so-called transfer files. BOE transfer files often contain more trader information than ledger books and we use the extra information to enrich our trader database. borrowed using the South Sea stock as collateral (see Figure 4) . 
Stock ledgers and indexes
Our principal data source consists of BOE and EIC stock ledgers. Figure 1 [ Figure (Carlos, Moyen, and Hill, 2002) . This difference in dividend payments led to different market prices for the senior stock and the new 'engrafted' stock. (1805)) and Martin (1876)) which mitigates potential external validity concerns.
10 Bank of England transfer files are retrieved from: AC28/1537-1554 11 National Archive: T70/199-202
Share loans
This section describes data sources and descriptive statistics of the loan facilities discussed in section 2.1. We collect loan holder names, amounts borrowed, loan initiation and repayment dates and interest due for all BOE loan holders from Bank's ledger books. Because loan information is stored in the ledger books we are able to link each investor's daily loan positions to her share trading activities without sacrificing any accuracy. In contrast, South Sea Company loans are matched less accurately because we link loan holders to stock traders based on trader (borrower) names. We therefore use Bank loan data for our main analysis and consider the SSC loan results as a validation of our findings. In total our sample contains 659 (656) unique shareholders who hold a BOE (SSC) loan. Table 1 describes the sample of investors who take up a BOE loan and
shows that the average loan holder holds 1,018 in equity (vis-à-vis 819 for the non-loan holder).
Furthermore, the table suggests that loan holders trade more actively, and are more likely to subscribe in new share issues.
Prices and dividends
We retrieve price data for the Bank of England, East India Company, Royal African Company, South Sea Company and London Assurance from Castaing's Course of the Exchange. We match sample periods for prices to those of the ledger books in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and dividend percentages and payment dates are retrieved from court of director minutes. 12 The Royal African
Company does not pay dividends during our sample period. 13 Prices are interpolated over a maximum of three days (see also Pastor and Veronesi (2009) ). Since there are no price quotations available for the new 'engrafted' RAC shares in the first few weeks of May we adopt an algorithm to infer prices for this period from the price quotes of the old RAC.
14 We exploit the fact that the 'engrafted' and old RAC shares are claims to the same stream of future cash flows except for the promised April 1721 dividend. This notion is confirmed by Carlos, Moyen, and Hill (2002) as they document that old and new RAC prices are unsurprisingly highly correlated: 0.9962. The procedure is straightforward as we first regress old prices on new prices using a sample period of June 1st, 1720 to August 31st, 1720. 15 In the second step we use the estimated coefficient and the available old RAC price quotes to infer daily prices of the 'engrafted' RAC shares up to May 28th. This procedure produces a floating price of £51.20 on May 2nd, which is well above the underwriter's price (Joseph Taylor paid £4.84) but considerably lower than the nominal book value of £100.
Subscription lists
During the summer of 1720, when prices reach peak levels, various companies take advantage of high valuations and issue new shares. More specifically, the South Sea Company (SSC) opens a third subscription on 17th June and a fourth on 24th August and the London Assurance Company (Henceforth: LAC) issues new shares on 12th August (see also Figure 7 ). Unfortunately, neither ledgers nor transfer files have survived for these two companies. Nevertheless, we relate loan positions and trading behavior to investor demand for the speculative SSC and LAC shares through subscription lists. Traders express their desire to buy third and fourth SSC subscription shares and 2nd subscription LAC shares by recording name and nominal amount on the subscription list.
We collect 4,481 (2,569) traders for the South Sea third (fourth) subscription 16 and 618 traders for London Assurance's second subscription list.
17
South Sea Company subscription lists only record first and last name which makes it more challenging to match them to our ledger sample. To the contrary, London Assurance subscription 14 The first price quote of RAC subscription shares by Castaign was on May 28th, 1720 15 We select this specific period to exclude the potential effect of periodic installment payments of subscribers on the price of the new RAC. The procedure required buyers of the new RAC shares to pay an initial payment of £8 and three remaining installment payments that were due on on 1 June (£8), 1 September (£5) and 1 December (£7). 
Performance measures
We measure annualized investor-specific realized portfolio returns as trading revenues scaled by average share holdings (in market value) and weighted by relative stock holdings
with Buys ijt and Sells ijt nominal amounts bought and sold by investor i of stock j at t and P jt stock j's price at t. over the period starting at purchase date t 0ij and ending at the trader-specific liquidation date (T ij ). We define investor i's realized returns as the value-weighted average of stock-specific trading revenues, where we weight by holdings (w ijt ). This implies that an investor realizing a £400 gain over a holding period of 2 years with £4,000 invested thus realizes a 10% return over 2 years.
This translates into 5% performance and without any intermediary buys and sells our measure is equivalent to an investor's realized annual return. Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) argue that investor skill should be measured as the amount of money extracted from financial markets rather than portfolio returns because it is more difficult to realize high returns on larger portfolios. All else equal, their measure thus attributes more skill to investors with larger holdings. We scale our measure by average holdings to facilitate interpretation and differentiate between realized performance and holdings in our cross-sectional analysis. Table 1 shows that the average trader gains 3% per annum in the years leading up to the bubble and 13% in the bubble year. As expected, 1720 also stands out in terms of volatility.
The 10th percentile trader loses 79%, while the 90th percentile trader makes a 65% return in the bubble year. The cross-sectional dispersion is thus much larger than during a non-bubble year, where the difference between the two percentiles is only 7%.
Realized returns as defined in equation (1) serves as the main work horse in our empirical analysis and its main advantage lies in the fact that it captures trader-specific realized trading gains. However, the measure fails to take time variation in performance into account. We therefore also compute trader-specific value-weighted portfolio returns over the interval of a trading week (τ =6) 20 .
19 We treat positive holdings at the start (end) of our sample period as purchases (sales). We do not subtract benchmark returns because it is hard to define an appropriate benchmark. The market consists of a handful of stocks dominated in size by the Bank of England and South Sea Company. A large IPO wave and the Bubble Act restricting new shares issues make it even more complicated to define a proper benchmark.
20 There was no trading on Sundays, therefore a trading week consisted of six days.
where R jτ represents security j's return over the next τ days and w ijt is defined in equation (3).
4 Credit provision and bubble trades 4.1 Who takes the margin loans?
In this section, we study whether investors who took the margin loans were systematically different from other investors. We run a Probit analysis where in most of the specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if an investor has ever taken a margin loan from the Bank of England and 0 otherwise. We then link the probability of having a margin loan to a set of investors characteristics and past trading. We present the marginal effects of the Probit regression in Table 2 . We first relate investors probability of having a margin loan with a set of measures connected to her trading frequency and -skills. First, we consider the measure of realized returns we discuss in section 3.6, computed between 1715 and 1719: we take it as a measure representing investors trading skills before the development of the bubble and the introduction of the loan facility. Furthermore, we relate it to investors number of trades and the average shareholdings, both between 1715 and May 1, 1720. Finally, we also examine a dummy variable, New Investor, that takes the value of 1 if an investor has never traded in any of the stock in our sample before 1720, and 0 otherwise. Table 2 , Column 1 reveals that realized returns between 1715 and 1719 were positively associated with the probability of taking a margin loan, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Both new investors and investors that frequently traded were more likely to take a margin loan.
A 1% increase in the pre-1720 number of traders increases the probability of obtaining a loan of about 6 percentage points. As about 12% of the investors in the sample took a margin loan, this estimate corresponds to a 50% probability increase. A new trader was almost 17 percentage points more likely to take a margin loan.
Column 2 studies other investors characteristics and looks at their place of residence: whether the investor is a foreigner or from London. We see that investors living in London (and hence closer to the Exchange) were 3.8 percentage points more likely to have a loan, whereas foreign investors were about 10 percentage points less likely to have a margin loan.
21 Column 3 adds additional information about the investors, in particular whether he/she is an aristocrat or a broker: in both cases, we find no statistical significant association with the probability of taking a margin loan. Column 4 looks at the gender of the investors and reveals that male investors were 6 percentage points more likely to take the loan. Column 5 repeats the specification of column 4, but it considers the probability of an investor to take a margin loan either provided by the Bank of England or the South Sea company. The dependent variable is in this case a dummy that takes the value of 1 if an investor took either a Bank of England or a South Sea company margin loan.
The results are broadly consistent with those displayed in first four columns with two exceptions:
large holdings between 1715 and 1719 are associated with a lower probability of taking a loan, and aristocrats were about 12 percentage points more likely to take a loan. Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. All in all, these results suggest that less experienced individuals and individuals who traded a lot are more likely to take margin loans from the Bank of England. In the current finance literature high number of trades is often associate with inexperience and lower performance.
[ 
Do loan holders extrapolate returns?
After looking at the characteristics of margin loan holders, we now study whether they display any trading behavior that differentiates them from an average investor. In particular, we see whether 21 The reference group of the location dummies are investors living in Britain in places other than London.
they acted as extrapolators or momentum traders, that is, they were more likely to buy (sell) following high (low) share returns. We first focus on investor buying activities and we proceed by estimating the following equation:
where Buy ijt is a dummy a variable that takes the value of 1 if investor i purchases a share of company j at time t, and 0 otherwise. Loan it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the investor holds a margin loans at time t, and 0 otherwise. In most of the specifications, we examine margin loans provided by the Bank of England, but we also run an additional test where we consider investors with margin loans provided either by the Bank or by the South Sea
Company. R j,t−τ indicate the returns company j stock in the past τ trading days. The main object of the interest is the coefficient γ. A positive γ indicates that an investor with a margin loan acts as an extrapolator: higher company js past returns will increase her probability of buying company js shares. A negative γ suggests that a margin loan holder acts as a contrarian trader: she is more likely to sell shares following high share returns. We progressively saturate the equation with a dense set of fixed effects. λ i and φ j indicate investor and company fixed effects, respectively. δ t is date fixed effects. κ it is trader×date fixed effects, which would absorb any time variant characteristics of trader i. ρ jt is company times date fixed effects which controls for any time variant characteristic of company j.
We display the results in Table 3 . Columns 1-3 consider the relationships between probability of buying a stock, margin loans and past returns without controlling for any set of fixed effects. We vary the time horizon of stocks past returns from a short time horizon of four trading days (Column 1) to a longer time horizon of fourteen days (Column 2). Column 3 considers an intermediate time horizon of six days, corresponding to a trading week. In each of the three specifications, we find a positive coefficient on the interaction term between margin loan holder and past returns, indicating that margin loan holders are more likely to buy share following high returns. The economic significance is also sizable. For instance, in our sample, the average share return in the past trading week is 0.75%, which implies, given the coefficient we find in Column 3, that loan holders were 27% more likely to buy following good stock performance. Between May 1 and June 15, when share prices grew the fastest, the average return in the past trading week was 1.9%
implying that loan holders would have been 67% more likely to buy vis a vis the average trader. Table 3 , Columns 4 and 5 progressively add fixed effects to the regression, while keeping on examining average returns during the past trading week. Column 4 controls for company and date fixed effects. The latter holds constant any time specific factor, such as the macroeconomic environment, that may affect trading. The former controls for any time invariant company characteristics that may affect investors buying propensity. We still find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term. Column 5 controls for both company times date fixed effects and trader times date fixed effects. The coefficient on the interaction term is still positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Its magnitude is about 30% lower than the coefficients in Columns 3 and 4, indicating that controlling for investors time variant characteristics is important and confirming that margin loans were not distributed randomly within the population of investors. Column 6 considers both the margin loans provided by the Bank of England and South Sea Company. In the interaction term, Loan it is now a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the investors has a loan either from the Bank of England or the South Sea company. Also considering this larger set of margin loans, we find a positive coefficient on the interaction term. The economic significance is again sizable: margin loan holders were 72% more likely to buy in the bull market of May 1 -June 15, 1720. Column 7, looks at the probability of selling rather than buying following past returns, and goes back to consider investors holding Bank of England loans. We still estimate equation 5, but we substitute the dependent variable with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor i sells shares of company j at date t and 0 otherwise. When we consider sales, we impose two filters on the data. First, the investor needs to have positive holdings at the beginning of the trading day, as investors with no holdings cannot sell. Second, if the investor holds a Bank of England loan, she needs to own more shares in respect to those collateralized with the Bank. This is because shares deposited as collateral could not be sold. Consistently, with the notion that margin loan holders acted as extrapolators, we find that they were more likely to sell following poor company returns, a result statistically significant at the 5% level. Also in this case, the economic significance is important: our estimate implies that following an average trading week return of -2.3%, which we compute between September 15 and October 6 1720 when the stock market started to crash, margin loan holders were three times more likely to sell compared to the average investors.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Do loan holders subscribe in new share issues?
Another important aspect of the investors trading behavior is how they approached the various shares subscription that occurred in the summer of 1720. The London Assurance Company issued shares in August 1720. While the call for subscription was set for August 12, shares became physically available to investors only in September 1720. This means that, ex-post any investor who subscribed the London Assurance shares could only lose money. We regress the probability of subscribing shares in the London Assurance Company (henceforth LAC) on whether an investor had a margin loan and a set of investors personal characteristics. More specifically, we define a dummy that equals one if an investor holds a loan in the week leading up to the date of subscription. We display the results in Table 4 . Column 1 looks at the univariate relationship between the probability of subscribing LAC shares and having a margin loan. It shows that investors with margin loans were 6 percentage points more likely to take the subscription. Since on average, about 4% of the BOE shareholders took the LAC subscription, our estimate implies that a margin loan holder was 1.5 times more likely to subscribe the London Assurance shares.
In Column 2, we add a set of investor characteristics. The loan holders probability of taking the subscription halves, but it is still large, 3 percentage points (75%) and statistically significant at the 1% level. Column 3 considers whether margin loan holders of either the Bank of England or the South Sea company were more likely to take the subscription. We still find a positive coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level. The regressions also reveal the male investors and investors with a history of frequent trading were also more likely to subscribe LAC shares.
We run a similar analysis examining the probability of a margin loan investor to subscribe to the third and fourth share offering of the South Sea Company. In both cases, new South Shares were sold to investors at a price of £1,000 per share when the market price was about £750, in June 16 1720 -the time of the third subscription, and £820 on August 24, the date of the fourth subscription. We present the results in Table 5 . Similarly, with what we found for the London Assurance company, margin loan holders were more likely to subscribe to both the third and fourth South Sea shares subscription. A Bank of England margin loan holder was between 7 and 15 percentage points more likely to subscribe (Columns 1 and 2) South Sea Share in the third subscription. Given that 17% of the Bank shareholders acquired shares during the third subscription, these estimates correspond to an increase of about 41% and 88%, respectively. In the case of the fourth subscription, margin loan holders were between 8 and 15 percentage points more likely to take the subscription (Columns 4 and 5), corresponding to an increase of 82% and 118% respectively (give that 9.7% of the Bank shareholders subscribed). The economic effects become larger when we also consider the margin loans provided by the South Sea company. This result is not surprising as historiography reports that many investors took a loan from the South Sea company to acquire more of its shares.
[ Table 4 about here.]
Trading performance of loan holders
We now turn to evaluating investors returns from their trading and relate them to whether they held a margin loan. We first look at the measure of realized performance, we presented in equation 1, Section 3.6 and we relate it to Loan i (d). We present the results in Table 6 . Column 1 looks at the univariate relationship between realized returns and Bank of England margin loan. In this specification, the constant corresponds to the realized returns of Bank of England shareholders without margin loans. Interestingly, the constant is positive, statistically significant at the 1% level and sizable. Bank of England shareholders without a loan obtained a realized return of about 11%.
Column 1 also reveals that loan holders displayed negative performance: the coefficient the dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Margin loan holders lost 2.6 percentage points on their investments in the BOE, EIC and RAC (0.148 -0.172).
Columns 2 adds various a set of investors characteristics. We still find that BOE margin loan holders realized an inferior performance compared to an average Bank of England shareholder.
Since, the realized performance of an average Bank shareholder is about 12%, the estimate in Column 2 implies that a loan holder underperforms an average investor by about 90%. It is also important to notice that coefficient on Loan margin loan holders underperform investors without loans. The result is statistically significant at the 5% in the univariate specification we present in Column 3, but, while keeping the negative sign, no longer statistically significant in Column 4.
We keep on examining investors performance in Table 7 , where we look at ex-ante buy and hold returns on various time horizons and, again compare, investors with and without margin loans. In particular, for each investor, we compute the returns for next 15, 20 and 30 days of her portfolio in a certain day, and like in the realized returns analysis, we compute portfolios made of Bank of England, East India Company and Royal African company shares. Also, here we find that at different time horizons, the portfolio of margin loan holders underperform the portfolio of an average Bank shareholder. Since the absolute value of the negative coefficient is higher than the constant, margin loan holders lose money with their trading strategies.
[ Table 6 about here.]
Do loan holders push up prices?
An important question for the pricing of assets is to examine whether the buying pressure of the loan holders were strong enough to move prices. In order to answer this question, we change the unit of observation of the analysis and focus on company j at time t. We estimate the following regression equation:
where R jt is the end of trading day return of company j at date t. BuyP ress 
BuyP ress
Loan jt
Similarly, we define the buying pressure of non-loan holders as:
BuyP ress
We present the results in Table 8 . In the first column, as always, we consider investors with Bank of England margin loans. Moreover, the specification in column 1 controls for the Buying Pressure of investors without margin loans and the lagged measure of buying pressure both for investors with and without margin loans. We see that loan holders buying pressure at date t has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The economic significance is also sizable:
multiplying the standard deviation of buying pressure (0.504) by the coefficient, we obtain 0.007 × 0.504 = 0.03, that is daily returns increase of 0.3 percentage points. Since the average daily return is 0.84%, this means that a standard deviation increase of loan holders buying pressure increases daily returns of about 35%. Interestingly, Column 1 also reveals that the buying pressure of investors without a margin loan has a positive but not statistically significant coefficient. These results lend support to the notion that loan holders trades can actually move prices. This could be because loan holders generate extra-excess of demand that is not met by the supply provided by investors without margin loans. It could also be possible that loan holders trade in days with low liquidity.
Column 2 adds company fixed effects to the specification in Column 1, and results are basically unaltered. Column 3 addresses issues related to reverse causality, also control for the company returns in the past trading day: the results are basically unchanged. Column 4 considers the buying pressure of traders with either Bank of England or South Sea company loans. We find that buying pressure of loan holders is still positive, but no longer statistically significant. This may be due to South Sea company loan holders being more concerned buying South Sea shares rather than Bank of England, East India company and Royal African company equity (as also suggested by the results on subscriptions we present in Table 6 ). As a result, the buying pressure measure we consider in Column 3 may be noisier.
[ Table 8 about here.]
Conclusion
This paper studies the relation between margin lending, individual trading behavior and stock prices during a bubble. In theory, credit provision could facilitate either rational arbitrageurs or speculators. Whether the marginal borrower is a speculator fueling the bubble or a rational agent reverting prices to fundamental values is our main empirical question.
We collect every single stock transaction with buyer and seller identities for three large British companies during the classical 1720 South Sea Bubble. In May of that year, the Bank of England grants its shareholders the right to borrow cash by collateralizing their shares. Each investor can borrow up to the nominal value of the share and loans are recorded in the stock ledger books of the Bank. The meticulous documentation of the transactions allows us to link each investor's share trading to her loan positions on a daily basis. Despite the micro character of our data, we are able to cover more than 50% of the British market over the course of the bubble and even five years leading up to it.
We find that the marginal borrower shows several signs of speculative trading behavior. First, we document that a loan holder acts as an extrapolator by buying stocks that have experienced high returns in the recent past. This evidence is consistent with the notion that borrowers ride the bubble. Second, we find that borrowers realize lower returns than investors without a loan.
Third, we find that margin loan holders are more likely to subscribe to new share offerings at peak prices. It is clear that this strategy is extremely risky and we can ex-post determine that it also leads to negative returns. Finally, we show that there is a positive relation between loan holder buying pressure and stock prices during the bubble. 
Royal African Company
This figure shows how many traders are active in each of the companies in our sample, with overlapping areas indicating that traders are active in more than one company. This table reports parameter estimates and corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) for a linear probability regression of buy (sell) dummies on a loan dummy (Loan BOE it (d)), realized returns over the past six trading days (R jt−6 ) using opening prices and the interaction of a loan dummy and realized returns.
takes the value of one if investor i buys (sells) share j in the six days following day t. Loan ) and the number of observations (N ). We control for date fixed effects (DateF E), company fixed effects (CompanyF E), trader times date fixed effects (T rader × DateF E), company times date fixed effects (Company × DateF E). Standard errors are double clustered at the trader and date level.
0.046*** (0.015) (d)), taking the value of one if investor i holds a BOE loan at t and loan dummy (Loan it (d)), taking the value of one if investor i holds a loan at t with either the Bank of England or the South Sea Company. Forwardlooking returns are defined as the return that trader i would have earned over the next τ days based on her share holdings at t. We report parameter estimates and corresponding standard errors (in parentheses). 'R 2 ' is the adjusted R 2 and N the number of observations. 
